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Under the Major Crimes Act (MCA)1, federal courts have exclusive 
jurisdiction over several enumerated criminal offenses that occur in Indian 
Country and are committed by “Indians.” When an individual is an enrolled 
member of a federally recognized tribe, “Indian” status is easily established 
and federal courts hold the authority to prosecute. A jurisdictional issue 
arises whenever courts hear cases involving individuals that fall slightly 
outside specified membership requirements. Although such individuals are 
not qualified for tribal membership, many tribal courts exercise jurisdiction 
over them, still considering them to be “Indian” under the MCA. 
Additionally, some tribes recognize “Indian” status by extending benefits to 
these non-members because they are close descendants of enrolled 
members.  
Courts have long searched for the most suitable and consistent way to 
define “Indian” under the MCA to settle jurisdictional battles between 
states and the federal government. The United States Supreme Court has 
not specified the appropriate way to reach that definition, and it declined to 
rule on the issue once again after a petition for writ was filed in State v. 
Nobles, a case arising out of the North Carolina Supreme Court.2  
Part I of this Note serves to introduce the issues surrounding the lack of a 
clear definition of the word “Indians” in the MCA. Part II will examine the 
background leading up to the current circuit split regarding this subject 
matter. Part III specifies the particulars of that circuit split. Part IV breaks 
down North Carolina’s case of first impression regarding this issue. Part V 
discusses the writ petition that defendant George Nobles filed in his case. 
Finally, Part VI argues, consistent with the writ petition, that the federal 
jurisprudence on this issue is needlessly convoluted. The correct and most 
effective entity to decide whether an individual is considered “Indian” 
under the MCA is the respective tribe itself.  
                                                                                                                 
 * Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law. 
 1. Otherwise known as the Indian Major Crimes Act (MCA). 
 2. 838 S.E.2d 373 (N.C. 2020). 
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II. Background Leading to the Major Crimes Act (MCA) 
and the Court’s Attempt to Define “Indian” 
The second section of this Note offers a brief explanation of the events 
that ultimately produced the circuit split surrounding the issue of 
determining Indian status under the MCA.  
A. Enactment of the MCA 
In 1854, the Indian Country Crimes Act (ICCA) extended the general 
criminal laws of the United States to crimes committed in Indian Country.3 
However, this extension had three exceptions: (1) offenses committed by 
one Indian against the person or property of another Indian; (2) offenses 
committed by an Indian in Indian Country against anyone, if the perpetrator 
of that offense has already been punished by the local law of the tribe; and 
(3) any case where, by treaty stipulations, the exclusive jurisdiction over 
such offenses is or may be reserved to the Indian tribe.4 In 1883, the 
Supreme Court held, in accordance with the ICCA, that federal courts did 
not have jurisdiction over crimes committed by one Indian against another 
Indian in Indian country.5  
In response to this decision, Congress enacted the Major Crimes Act 
(MCA) in 1885.6 The MCA extended federal jurisdiction over “any Indian” 
who committed any of the listed major crimes in the statute “against the 
person or property of another Indian or other person.”7 The MCA did not 
define the term “Indian,” leaving courts to interpret its meaning.  
B. United States v. Rogers 
The test for determining who qualifies as an Indian for the purposes of 
the ICCA and the MCA originated in an 1845 Supreme Court decision—
United States v. Rogers8—and remains controlling today. In this case, 
William Rogers, a white man, was charged with murdering another white 
man on land belonging to the Cherokee Tribe.9 Rogers claimed that, despite 
being white men, he and his victim had essentially been adopted into the 
Tribe, were recognized as Indians by the Tribe, and both exercised all the 
                                                                                                                 
 3. Alex Tallchief Skibine, Indians, Race, and Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country, 
10 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 49, 51 (2017). 
 4. 18 U.S.C. § 1152. 
 5. See Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883). 
 6. 18 U.S.C. § 1153. 
 7. Id. 
 8. 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1845). 
 9. Id. at 571. 
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rights and privileges of Cherokee Indians.10 Thus, Rogers asserted that the 
court did not have jurisdiction over his case.11  
The predecessor statute to the ICCA withheld federal jurisdiction over 
crimes committed by one Indian against another Indian.12 In interpreting 
this statute, the Supreme Court reasoned that “the exception is confined to 
those who by the usages and customs of the Indians are regarded as 
belonging to their race.”13 Rogers was not an Indian solely because of his 
political affiliation to the Tribe, therefore enumerating the ancestral 
requirement for Indian status.14  
Lower courts interpreted Rogers as creating a two-pronged test for 
determining whether a person is an Indian under the MCA.15 Pursuant to 
this test, an “Indian” must: (1) have some quantum of Indian blood; and (2) 
be recognized as an Indian by a tribe or the federal government.16 Because 
the first prong merely requires “some” Indian blood, “evidence of a parent, 
grandparent, or great-grandparent who is clearly identified as an Indian is 
generally sufficient to satisfy this prong.”17 The tribal or federal recognition 
prong “probes whether the Native American has a sufficient non-racial link 
to a formerly sovereign people.”18 
III. The Current Circuit Split 
The first prong of the Rogers test is typically determined with ease, 
seeing that it only requires a finding that a defendant has some quantum of 
Indian blood. Thus, the circuit split primarily lies within the second prong 
of the Rogers test: whether a defendant has obtained tribal recognition as an 
Indian. Lower courts approach recognition by a tribal entity in three 
different ways—by directly asking whether a specific tribe recognizes the 
defendant as Indian, by using a four-factor analysis, and lastly through a 
more wholistic approach that examines those four factors, as well as any 
other aspects the court finds relevant. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 10. Id.  
 11. Id. 
 12. Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, § 25, 92 Stat. 729, 733. 
 13. Rogers, 45 U.S. at 573. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See, e.g., United States v. Stymiest, 581 F.3d 759, 762 (8th Cir. 2009); United States 
v. Zepeda, 729 F.3d 1103, 1113 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 16. See, e.g., Stymiest, 581 F.3d at 762; Zepeda, 729 F.3d at 1113. 
 17. United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1223 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 18. Id. at 1224 (quoting St. Cloud v. United States, 702 F. Supp. 1456 (D.S.D. 1988)). 
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A. Approach One 
The first approach is to simply ask whether the respective tribe 
recognizes the defendant as Indian for purposes of their own criminal 
jurisdiction or in other respects such as offering benefits to certain non-
member descendants.19 The Seventh Circuit, the Utah Supreme Court, and a 
dissenting judge in the Ninth Circuit utilize this method.20 For example, in 
United States v. Cruz, the defendant was classified as a “descendant.”21 
This classification gave the defendant access to certain tribal benefits 
“including medical treatment at any Indian Health Service facility in the 
United States, certain educational grants, housing assistance and hunting 
and fishing privileges on the reservation.”22 For the dissenting Chief Judge 
Kozinski, the mere fact that the Tribe categorized the defendant as a 
“descendant” and extended those benefits to him because of that status was 
enough to establish tribal recognition required by the second prong of 
Rogers.23 Ultimately, this method defers to the tribal entities’ determination 
of tribal recognition. 
B. Approach Two 
The second enumerated approach courts apply in determining the second 
prong of the Rogers test uses a four-factor analysis in which the factors are 
considered in declining order of significance. The test arises out of St. 
Cloud v. United States, a decision handed down by the United States 
District Court for the District of South Dakota, which considers: “1) 
                                                                                                                 
 19. For example, in the Nobles case covered in this Note, defendant Nobles’ mother is 
an enrolled member of the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians (EBCI), which makes Nobles 
what the tribe considers a “first descendant.” State v. Nobles, 838 S.E.2d 373, 375 (N.C. 
2020). While first descendants are not entitled to all benefits that enrolled members are, the 
EBCI extends certain benefits to them. Id. at 376. For the purposes of the first method, this 
would be the EBIC “recognizing” Nobles as an Indian because they are extending benefits 
from their tribe to him due to his status as a first descendant. Id. 
 20. See United States v. Torres, 733 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating that the test 
was simply “tribal or governmental recognition as an Indian,” not delving into any list of 
factors that would establish that recognition); see also State v. Perenk, 858 P.2d 927, 933 
(Utah 1993) (finding that defendant being formally recognized by the tribe as an Indian was 
enough to satisfy the second prong of Rogers test, not stating any additional factors 
considered); United States v. Cruz, 554 F.3d 840, 852 (9th Cir. 2009) (Kozinski, C.J., 
dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s use of a four-factor test as overly convoluted and not 
supported by Rogers). 
 21. 554 F.3d at 840. 
 22. Id. at 852. 
 23. Id. 
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enrollment in a tribe; 2) government recognition formally and informally 
through providing the person assistance reserved only to Indians; 3) 
enjoying benefits of tribal affiliation; and 4) social recognition as an Indian 
through living on a reservation and participating in Indian social life.”24 
Several cases in the Ninth Circuit have utilized this method through a 
process by which they consider numerous factual findings that help them 
weigh the factors and ultimately determine whether a defendant is 
recognized as an Indian.25 
C. Approach Three 
The final method considers the St. Cloud factors non-exhaustively and in 
no order of importance, virtually using the four-factor test as a starting 
point for determining recognition by a tribal entity.26 Various courts, 
including the Eighth Circuit,27 the Idaho Supreme Court,28 and North 
Carolina Supreme Court,29 utilize this method for determining the second 
prong of the Rogers test. This approach considers any possible factors that 
the court finds relevant in determining Indian status.30 
IV. Nobles v. North Carolina 
On February 28, 2020, the Supreme Court of North Carolina filed its 
first-ever opinion addressing the determination of Indian status under the 
MCA.31 Aside from Indian status determination, the Court also decided 
whether that designation should be a question for the judge or the jury32 The 
Court used the third approach to determining Indian status mentioned above 
to conclude that the defendant did not satisfy the “recognition prong” of the 
Rogers test, and opined that Indian status was to be decided by a jury, rather 
than the judge. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 24. 702 F. Supp. 1456, 1461 (D.S.D. 1988). 
 25. See United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1224 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. 
Zepeda, 729 F.3d 1103, 1114 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 26. See United States v. Stymiest, 581 F.3d 759, 764 (8th Cir. 2009); see also State v. 
George, 422 P.3d 1142, 1146 (Idaho 2018); State v. Nobles, 838 S.E.2d 373, 380 (N.C. 
2020). 
 27. Stymiest, 581 at 764. 
 28. George, 422 P.3d at 1146. 
 29. Nobles, 838 S.E.2d at 380. 
 30. Id. at 382 (also considering whether the defendant had been subjected to civil or 
criminal tribal jurisdiction in the past). 
 31. Id. at 373. 
 32. Id. at 377. 
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A. Factual and Procedural Background 
On September 30, 2012, Barbara Preidt was robbed and fatally shot 
outside of a hotel in Jackson County, North Carolina.33 The crime occurred 
“within the Qualla Boundary—land [] held in trust by the United States for 
the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians (EBCI).”34 As a result, the Cherokee 
Indian Police arrested the defendant, George Lee Nobles, and two others for 
the crime.35 Because Nobles’ co-defendants were enrolled members of the 
Cherokee Nation, “they were brought before an EBCI tribal magistrate for 
indictment proceedings.”36 However, because Nobles was not an enrolled 
member of the EBCI, he was brought before a county magistrate and 
charged in Jackson County with “first-degree murder, robbery with a 
dangerous weapon, and two counts of possession of a firearm by a felon.”37 
Nobles moved to dismiss the charges for lack of jurisdiction, arguing he 
was an Indian pursuant to the MCA and thus could not be tried in state 
court.38 At the trial court’s pre-trial hearing on Nobles’ motion, the parties 
stipulated that, since Nobles’ mother was an enrolled member of the EBCI, 
Nobles would be considered a first descendant of the Tribe.39 Testimony 
offered at the hearing indicated that, while first descendants do not receive 
the full range of benefits that enrolled members enjoy, they are eligible for 
some benefits that persons not affiliated with the Tribe are not.40 These 
benefits pertain to property, health care, employment, and education.
41
 
The trial court heard a multitude of testimonies that aided in its ruling on 
the motion. Significantly, testimony revealed that, in a pre-sentence report 
for prison time Nobles served from 1993 to 2011, his race was listed as 
“white.”42 When Nobles was released from that prison stint, he listed his 
race as “white” on an Application for Interstate Compact Transfer.43 
Nobles’ probation officers testified that, after he was released in 2011, he 
lived at various addresses on or near the Qualla Boundary up until his arrest 
                                                                                                                 
 33. Id. at 375. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 376. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id.  
 43. Id. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol45/iss2/5
No. 2] NOTES 367 
 
 
in the current case.44 The probation officers also testified that Nobles never 
presented to them that he was an Indian.45  
Nobles’ mother testified that, as a child, Nobles attended both Cherokee 
tribal school and county public school.46 On one Bureau of Indian Affairs 
enrollment application, Nobles’ mother listed his “Degree Indian” as 
“none” and on another enrollment application she listed his tribal affiliation 
as “Cherokee.”47 Additional testimony was heard regarding Nobles’ health 
care history.48 This testimony uncovered that, as a child, portions of 
Nobles’ medical bills for treatment at a county hospital were covered by the 
Tribe.49 Nobles received care at the Cherokee Indian Hospital on five 
occasions as a minor.50 
The trial court ultimately denied Nobles’ motion to dismiss, finding he 
was not an Indian within the meaning of the MCA.51 Nobles then filed a 
petition for writ of certiorari to the North Carolina Supreme Court seeking 
review of the trial court’s order, but his writ was denied.52 In 2016, Nobles 
“renewed his motion to dismiss . . . in the trial court for lack of jurisdiction 
and, in the alternative, moved that the [] issue relating to his Indian status 
[should] be submitted to the jury[.53] The trial court denied both motions.”54  
Nobles was subsequently tried for the crimes, convicted, and sentenced 
to life in prison without the possibility of parole.55 He appealed his 
conviction to the North Carolina Court of Appeals, which ultimately held 
that he was not an Indian under the MCA and that the question of that status 
was not one for the jury.56 Nobles filed a petition for discretionary review 
with the North Carolina Supreme Court in 2018.57 The court accepted 
Nobles’ petition and rendered a decision in 2020.58 
  
                                                                                                                 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id.  
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 377. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id.  
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id.  
 58. Id. 
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B. Holding and Reasoning 
The North Carolina Supreme Court considered whether Nobles was 
classified as an Indian under the MCA and whether that determination 
should be presented to a jury.59 The court held that Nobles did not qualify 
for Indian status under the MCA.60 It additionally held that this 
determination was reserved solely for a judge rather than a jury.61  
1. Denial of Nobles’ Motion to Dismiss 
The court stated that there was no dispute as to the fact that the crime at 
issue took place in “Indian Country,” nor was there a dispute that the 
charges against Nobles constituted major crimes under the MCA.62 Instead, 
the dispute before the court was whether Nobles qualified for Indian status 
under the Act.63 The court reasoned that, since the term “Indian” was not 
defined by the MCA, its reliance would need to fall on Rogers’ two-
pronged test.64 The court noted that the first prong—whether a given 
individual has some Indian blood—was not at issue because both parties 
agreed that Nobles possessed an Indian blood quantum of 4.29%.65 
Therefore, only the second prong—whether the given tribe or the federal 
government recognizes the individual as an Indian—was up for 
consideration.66  
The court relied on other courts’ analyses on this issue since Nobles’ 
case was one of first impression in North Carolina.67 It then noted that the 
majority of tribunals utilize the four-factor balancing test first articulated in 
St. Cloud.68 The factors include: “1) enrollment in a tribe; 2) government 
recognition formally and informally through providing the person 
assistance reserved only to Indians; 3) enjoying benefits of tribal affiliation; 
and 4) social recognition as an Indian through living on a reservation and 
participating in Indian social life.”69 
                                                                                                                 
 59. Id.  
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 383. 
 62. Id. at 377. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id.  
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 377–78. 
 69. Id. (quoting St. Cloud v. United States, 702 F. Supp. 1456, 1461 (D.S.D. 1988)). 
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The court explained the current split regarding the application of the St. 
Cloud factors; some courts view the factors as exclusive and in descending 
order of significance while others hold that the factors should not be viewed 
as exhaustive nor tied to any order of importance.70 The Nobles court then 
adopted the latter application, citing the “needed flexibility for courts in 
determining the inherently imprecise issue of whether an individual should 
be considered to be Indian.”71 Further, “relevant factors may exist beyond 
the four St. Cloud factors that bear on this issue.”72  
Before applying the St. Cloud factors, the court addressed Nobles’ 
threshold argument that applying the factors was unnecessary because his 
first-descendant status irrefutably demonstrated tribal recognition under the 
second prong of Rogers.73 The court rejected this argument and cited its 
concern that “such an approach would reduce the Rogers test into a purely 
blood-based inquiry, thereby conflating the two prongs of the Rogers test 
into one.”74 Accepting Nobles’ argument would “defeat the purpose of the 
test, which is to ascertain not just a defendant’s blood quotient, but also his 
social, societal, and spiritual ties to a tribe.”75  
Moreover, the court was not persuaded by Nobles’ argument that the 
North Carolina Supreme Court was bound by the decision of the Cherokee 
Court in Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v. Lambert on this matter.76 The 
issue in Lambert was whether the defendant was an Indian for the purposes 
of EBCI tribal criminal jurisdiction.77 Though not an enrolled member of 
the Tribe, the Lambert defendant was recognized as a first descendant.78  
The Cherokee Court rejected the Lambert defendant’s argument that lack 
of enrollment was dispositive of her Indian status, explaining that 
membership in a tribe is not a crucial factor in the test for determining 
whether a person is Indian for the purpose of criminal jurisdiction.79 
Instead, the Lambert court relied on the Rogers test and the St. Cloud 
factors, citing the benefits available to EBCI first descendants.80 The court 
                                                                                                                 
 70. Id. at 378. 
 71. Id.  
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 378–79. 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. at 379. 
 76. Id. (citing E. Band of Cherokee Indians v. Lambert, 3 Cher. Rep. 62 (N.C. Cherokee 
Tribal Ct. 2003)). 
 77. Id. (citing Lambert, 3 Cher. Rep. at 62). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. (citing Lambert, 3 Cher. Rep. at 64). 
 80. Id.  
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in Lambert ruled the defendant met the definition of an Indian because she 
availed herself to the civil jurisdiction of the Cherokee Court under a 
pending lawsuit against a tribal member and because first descendants are 
participating members of the tribal community and treated as such by the 
Tribe.81 
The Court rejected Nobles’ reliance on Lambert for a variety of reasons. 
First, the court noted that it was “far from clear that the Lambert court 
intended to announce a categorial rule that all first descendants must be 
classified as Indians.”82 If first-descendant classification was itself enough 
to suffice Indian status, the court would not have sought additional evidence 
to make its determination of whether the defendant was subject to its 
jurisdiction.83 
 Secondly, the Nobles court concluded that, even if the Cherokee Court 
did intend to make such a categorial rule, the North Carolina Supreme 
Court was not bound by it.84 The court noted that the Supreme Court of the 
EBCI has clarified that it does not consider Cherokee Court opinions “as 
having any precedential value since the Cherokee Court is the trial court for 
[the Cherokee Supreme Court].”85  
Lastly, the Supreme Court of North Carolina rejected Nobles’ reliance on 
Lambert on precedential and jurisdictional grounds.86 A prior exercise of 
jurisdiction by a tribal court “is not dispositive on the issue of whether a 
state court possesses jurisdiction over such defendant in a particular case.”87 
a) Applying the St. Cloud Factors  
Having rejected Nobles’ initial arguments, the court applied the four St. 
Cloud factors. It also decided that it would consider any other relevant 
factors, if any were raised by Nobles, in making this determination. As for 
the first St. Cloud factor, enrollment in a tribe, it was an undisputed fact that 
Nobles was not an enrolled member of any federally recognized tribe.88 
Therefore, that element was easily settled.  
                                                                                                                 
 81. Id. (citing Lambert, 3 Cher. Rep. at 65). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 379–80.  
 85. Id. at 380 (quoting Teesateskie v. E. Band of Cherokee Indians Minors Fund, 13 
Am. Tribal Law 180, 188 (E. Cher. Sup. Ct. 2015)). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. (citation omitted). 
 88. Id. 
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The second St. Cloud factor, government recognition through provision 
of any assistance, required the Nobles court to decide whether Nobles was 
the “recipient of ‘government recognition formally and informally through 
receipt of assistance reserved only to Indians.’”89 The court pointed out that 
Nobles failed to satisfy this factor solely by offering a list of benefits 
available to descendants.90 It opined that this factor of the St. Cloud test is 
concerned with the tribal benefits a defendant has actually received and not 
just benefits for which that individual is eligible.91 The court made notice of 
the benefits that Nobles actually received, which consisted of five 
occurrences of free medical care that he acquired as a minor at the 
Cherokee Indian Hospital.92  
In analyzing the third factor, enjoyment of benefits of tribal affiliation, 
the court had to determine whether Nobles “received any broader benefits 
from his affiliation with a tribe—apart from the receipt of government 
assistance.”93 The court referred to the trial court’s showing that, aside from 
the fact that Nobles lived on or near the Qualla Boundary for the fourteen 
months leading up to the murder, as well as his partial attendance in the 
Cherokee tribal school system as a child, he enjoyed no other benefits of 
tribal affiliation.94 
For the fourth and final St. Cloud factor, social recognition as an Indian, 
the court considered “whether [Nobles] received ‘social recognition as an 
Indian through residence on a reservation and participation in Indian social 
life.’”95 The court pointed to various relevant factors that other courts 
consider, such as whether the individual speaks a tribal language, lives on 
the reservation, attends school on the reservation, socializes with other 
Indians, and participates in tribal rituals.96 Other courts have found that this 
fourth factor weighs against defendants “who have never been involved in 
Indian cultural, community, or religious events; never participated in tribal 
politics; and have not placed any emphasis on their Indian heritage.”97 
Nobles lived on or near the Qualla Boundary for about fourteen months, 
had a girlfriend who was an enrolled tribal member, and had two tattoos 
                                                                                                                 
 89. Id. (quoting United States v. Cruz, 554 F.3d 840, 846 (9th Cir. 2009)). 
 90. Id.  
 91. Id. (citation omitted). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 380–81. 
 94. Id. at 381. 
 95. Id. (quoting United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1224 (9th Cir. 2005)). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
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purporting to demonstrate celebration of his Indian heritage.98 Despite these 
facts, the court emphasized that the trial court revealed no findings that 
Nobles ever attended any cultural, community, or religious activities; that 
he spoke the tribal language; that he possessed a tribal ID; or that he 
partook in tribal politics.99 Additionally, an active elder of the EBCI Tribe 
testified she had never seen Nobles at any EBCI events and on several 
documents Nobles identified himself as “white.”100 
(5) Other Relevant Factors 
Since the court determined that it would analyze the factors non-
exclusively and in no order of importance, it kept open the possibility that 
Nobles could point to other relevant factors that may play a role in 
examining the second prong of the Rogers test.101 The court noted that 
several other courts consider the additional relevant fact of whether an 
individual was ever subject to tribal jurisdiction in the past.102 Nobles, 
however, had never been subject to any tribal jurisdiction in the past, nor 
did he point the court to any additional factors that would be relevant under 
the second prong of the Rogers test.103  
After analyzing all relevant factors under the Rogers test, the court 
concluded that Nobles was not an Indian for purposes of the MCA.104 
Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Nobles’ motion to 
dismiss.105 
2. Special Jury Verdict  
Next, the court moved to address Nobles’ second claim that the 
determination of his Indian status should have been presented to the jury 
rather than the judge.106 Nobles cited two of the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina’s decisions in support of this contention: State v. Batdorf107 and 
State v. Rick.108 
                                                                                                                 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 381–82. 
 103. Id. at 382. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. 238 S.E.2d 497 (N.C. 1977)). 
 108. 463 S.E.2d 182 (N.C. 1995)). 
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The Nobles court recounted that, in Batdorf, the defendant challenged the 
trial court’s territorial jurisdiction and cited that there was “insufficient 
evidence that his crime was committed in North Carolina . . . ‘so as to 
confer jurisdiction on the courts of [North Carolina].’”109 In deciding 
Batdorf, the North Carolina Supreme Court reasoned that the trial court 
“should have instructed the jury to ‘return a verdict indicating lack of 
jurisdiction’ if the jury was not satisfied that the crime occurred in North 
Carolina.”110  
Similarly, in State v. Rick, the North Carolina Supreme Court noted that 
the defendant challenged the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction, contending 
that the State did not adequately prove whether the crime took place in 
North Carolina.111 Citing Batdorf, the Rick court held that the question of 
jurisdiction should have been submitted to the jury.112 
In Nobles, the court rejected Nobles’ reliance on Batdorf and Rick; 
unlike Nobles’ case, the issue in Batdorf and Rick was the court’s territorial 
jurisdiction.113 The Nobles court pointed out that Nobles was “making an 
entirely separate argument that he was required to be prosecuted in federal 
court pursuant to the MCA.”114 Therefore, since Nobles’ claim was not a 
territorial jurisdiction challenge, the court’s decisions in Batdorf and Rick 
did not apply.115  
To the Nobles court, the absence of any factual dispute relevant to the 
MCA analysis made it senseless to hold that a jury was required to 
determine a “purely legal jurisdictional issue . . . .”116 The court illustrated 
this principle in State v. Darroch.117 The Darroch defendant, a Virginia 
resident, hired two people to kill her husband.118 The defendant’s husband 
was killed in North Carolina by the hitmen.119 On appeal, the defendant 
argued the North Carolina trial court lacked jurisdiction considering the 
murder took place in North Carolina but was arranged in another state.120 
                                                                                                                 
 109. Nobles, 838 S.E.2d at 382 (quoting Batdorf, 238 S.E.2d at 502). 
 110. Id. (quoting Batdorf, 238 S.E.2d at 503).  
 111. Id. (citing Rick, 463 S.E.2d at 186). 
 112. Rick, 463 S.E.2d at 186 (citing Batdorf, 238 S.E.2d at 503). 
 113. Nobles, 838 S.E.2d at 382.  
 114. Id.  
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 383. 
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 120. Id. (citing Darroch, 287 S.E.2d at 859–60). 
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The Darroch defendant cited Batdorf and contended that, because she 
raised a jurisdictional issue, it was a question of fact for the jury.121 The 
Darroch court rejected this argument, explaining that Batdorf is only 
applicable when the facts on which the State bases its jurisdiction are in 
dispute.122 The Darroch defendant was challenging the legal theory of 
jurisdiction rather than raising any disputes in the facts that the State argued 
supported jurisdiction.123  
The Nobles court concluded that, as in Darroch, Nobles did not 
challenge the underlying facts on which the State based its jurisdiction; 
rather, Nobles challenged the trial court’s determination that the MCA was 
not applicable to his case.124 The court ultimately opined that Nobles’ 
challenge was an “inherently legal question properly decided by the trial 
court rather than by the jury.”125 
3. Justice Earls’ Dissent 
The lone dissenter, Justice Anita Earls, believed Nobles was entitled to a 
special jury verdict on the issue of his “Indian” status.126 Justice Earls 
asserted that, if the majority was correct in concluding that the question was 
not meant for a jury, she disagreed with its conclusion that Nobles was not 
an Indian under the MCA.127 
a) Special Jury Verdict  
In her dissent, Earls first attacked the majority’s argument that its 
decisions in Batdorf and Rick were not applicable to Nobles’ case.128 As a 
reminder, the Nobles court rejected Nobles’ reliance on these cases because 
the challenges there were to the court’s territorial jurisdiction and, here, 
Nobles challenged the State’s ability to prosecute him pursuant to the 
MCA.129 Earls argued that, regardless of this distinction, Nobles, “like the 
defendants in Batdorf and Rick, ‘[was] contesting the very power of [the] 
State to try him.’”130 Earls reminded the court that contesting this 
jurisdictional power was determined in Batdorf to be an issue presented for 
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 122. Id. 
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 125. Id.  
 126. Id. at 383–84 (Earls, J., dissenting). 
 127. Id. at 384. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 385. 
 130. Id. (quoting State v. Batdorf, 238 S.E.2d 497, 502 (N.C. 1977)). 
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a jury’s determination; thus, it should be determined by a jury here in this 
case.131 Earls then pointed out that, instead of explaining what made the 
challenge to territorial jurisdiction different from a jurisdictional challenge 
under the MCA, the majority erroneously alleged that the issue of Nobles’ 
Indian status was a “purely legal” issue that should not be decided by a 
jury.132 Absent any explanation of these differences by the majority, Earls’ 
dissent asserted that the issue of Indian status under the MCA “involves 
fundamental questions of fact,” making it a factual dispute for the jury 
alone.133  
The dissent acknowledged that this factual determination would not be 
an easy one for a jury; the issue “quickly devolves into a multifaceted 
inquiry requiring examination into factual areas not normally considered” 
by the courts, and “involves difficult questions of race, including the extent 
to which a defendant self-identifies as an Indian . . . .”134 Earls opined that, 
regardless of this difficulty, the determination was still factual, rendering it 
only suitable to be decided by a jury.135 In light of this “inherently factual 
inquiry,” as well as the court’s precedent in Batdorf and Rick that 
jurisdictional challenges are meant for jury determination, Earls 
respectfully opined that the issue should be submitted to a jury and proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt.136 
b) Denial of Nobles’ Motion to Dismiss 
For hypothetical purposes, Earls conceded that Nobles was not entitled 
to a special jury verdict.137 But in light of this fact, Earls still would have 
concluded that the defendant was an Indian under the MCA.138 
 First, Earls addressed the majority’s interpretation of Lambert. The 
majority’s interpretation was this: because the parties stipulated as to 
Lambert’s status as an EBCI first descendant but still conducted a further 
evidentiary hearing to make the determination of her Indian status, the 
logical inference was that first-descendant status alone was not enough to 
determine the issue.139 Earls explained that, because the tribal court had not 
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previously addressed the issue of Indian status of a non-member, the correct 
logical inference is that the court needed additional evidence only because 
the issue was one of first impression.140  
To Earls, this logical inference was particularly apparent given that 
nearly all factual findings from the tribal court addressed first descendants 
generally.141 Earls declared that Lambert “plainly ruled that first 
descendants are Indians.”142 She explained that this interpretation was 
further fostered by the tribal court’s subsequent ruling that same year in In 
re Welch, 3 Cher. Rep. 71 (N.C. Cherokee Ct. 2003), which relied on its 
conclusion in Lambert that first descendants were Indians for the purpose of 
criminal jurisdiction of the court.143 Earls specifically emphasized the 
Lambert court’s statement that “when a tribal magistrate conducts the St. 
Cloud test, if a defendant is a First Descendant, ‘the inquiry ends there and 
the Court has jurisdiction over the defendant.’”144  
Second, the dissent points out that, in examining the second prong of the 
Rogers test and applying the St. Cloud factors, the majority failed to 
recognize the significance of the fact that Nobles was incarcerated for 
nearly twenty years.145 Justice Earls reminds the court the importance this 
fact holds when examining Nobles’ ability to receive assistance and 
benefits due to tribal affiliation.146 Moreover, Nobles’ extended 
incarceration is significant when considering other parts of the St. Cloud 
factors, such as if Nobles participated in tribal politics.147  
In sum, Justice Earls focused on previous tribal court decisions and the 
Cherokee Rules of Criminal Procedure to conclude that first defendants 
were considered Indians under Rogers and the MCA. She additionally 
measured the St. Cloud factors while keeping in mind that Nobles spent a 
large portion of his life incarcerated. In doing all this, Earls would have 
determined that Nobles had been recognized by a tribe and as an Indian 
under the MCA.148 
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V. Nobles’ Petition for Writ of Certiorari  
After the North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals 
decision, Nobles petitioned the United States Supreme Court to review his 
case on July 27, 2020.149 The writ petition, specifically asked the Court to 
answer the following questions: (1) “How does one determine whether a 
defendant is an Indian?” and (2) “Is Indian status a jury question?”150 On 
October 5, 2020, the Supreme Court declined to review the petition.151 
A. Reasons to Grant the Petition 
Nobles’ petition gave two main reasons as to why the Court should grant 
his writ petition. First, Nobles cited the practical problem of not having a 
delineated way for courts to determine Indian status.152 Nobles offered that 
“a person who is an Indian in some jurisdictions (and who is thus triable 
only in the federal courts) is not an Indian in other jurisdictions (and is thus 
triable only in the state courts).”153 Second, pertaining to the question of 
whether Indian status is a jury question, was Nobles’ concern that the North 
Carolina Supreme Court veered from the conventional manner in which all 
other courts have considered the question, each finding that whether a 
defendant is an Indian is a factual question for the jury.154 Thus, Nobles 




1. The Court Should Decide How to Determine Indian Status Under the 
MCA 
Nobles’ writ petition pointed to the legal silence that ultimately created 
this issue.156 First to blame is the lack of any definition for the word 
“Indian” in the Major Crimes Act, mandating exclusive jurisdiction over 
Indians who commit certain crimes within Indian Country.157 Without any 
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 150. Id. at i.  
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statutory guidance to define “Indian,” Nobles stated that lower courts are 
forced to rely on the guidance provided by Rogers.158  
Nobles elucidated that Rogers has been interpreted to mean that a 
defendant is an Indian under the MCA “if (1) he is of Indian decent (often 
crudely described as having some ‘Indian blood’), and (2) he is recognized 
as an Indian by either the federal government or a federally-recognized 
tribe.”159 Nobles further explained that the lower courts are in agreement on 
two things regarding the two-pronged test enumerated in Rogers: first, that 
no specific percentage of Indian blood is required to satisfy the first prong 
and, second, that one can be considered Indian without being an enrolled 
member of a recognized tribe.160 Beyond these two clarifications, Nobles 
stated, the lower courts haven’t agreed on much more.161 
a) Three Methods Used by Lower Courts 
In this section of his writ petition, Nobles described the three differing 
approaches in determining the second prong of the Rogers test used by the 
lower courts, mentioned previously in greater detail in Part III of this 
Note.162 To briefly review, these three methods are: (1) simply asking 
whether the tribe recognizes the defendant as an Indian for the purposes of 
their own jurisdiction; (2) applying a four-factor test, in which the factors 
are considered in declining order of importance; and (3) considering all 
potential relevant factors in addition to the four-factor test in no order of 
importance.163  
b) The Supreme Court of North Carolina’s Decision Was Wrong 
After laying out the current split for the Court, Nobles explained why the 
method the North Carolina Supreme Court followed was both wrong and 
unworkable. This portion of Nobles’ writ petition was used to defend the 
first specified method, which asks the tribe if it recognizes a certain 
defendant as an Indian. 
First, Nobles made the claim that the multi-factor test used in method 
three by many courts, and now the North Carolina Supreme Court, is “no 
way to make threshold decisions about which court system has jurisdiction 
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to try a defendant.”164 According to Nobles, complicated tests like these 
waste time and money, focusing not on the merits of the case but on the 
issue of jurisdiction.165 Nobles then demonstrated to the Court that, in this 
case alone, the trial court heard twelve different witnesses, examined 
school, medical, employment, and probation records, and became versed in 
many aspects of the Cherokee tribal government, “including the health care 
and education it provides, the property rights it administers, and its system 
of voting.”166 All of these considerations ultimately led to 278 numbered 
findings of fact aiding in the jurisdictional determination before even 
touching the actual case at bar.167 To Nobles, bright lines are much more 
efficient than a test that considers potentially endless amounts of facts to 
determine which court takes the reins.168 
Nobles then outlined why, rather than using either the multi-factor test or 
the four-factor test other courts employ, simply asking whether the 
defendant is recognized as an Indian by the tribe is the most efficient way 
of determining Indian status for jurisdictional purposes.169 Nobles pointed 
out that tribes already make this determination when they exercise their 
own jurisdiction because their jurisdiction extends generally to “Indians” 
and not exclusively enrolled tribal members.170 Additionally, “[j]ust as 
tribes have the right to define their own membership, they have the right to 
define whom they will recognize as ‘Indian’ for criminal jurisdiction 
purposes.”171 From this, Nobles argued that “tribes are certainly in a better 
position to make this determination than state or federal judges are.”172 
Nobles bolstered his argument in favor of consulting directly with a 
given tribe by arguing that it is consistent with the intent of Congress at the 
time the MCA was enacted in 1885.173 The controlling definition of 
“Indian,” for jurisdictional purposes, at the time of the MCA’s enactment 
came from the Court’s holding in Rogers, which was “extremely simple and 
included no ‘factors’ for the courts to balance.”174 The Court in Rogers held 
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that an Indian was a person “whom Indians themselves ‘regarded as 
belonging to their race.’”175  
Retaining Rogers’ deference to the tribes is also consistent with both the 
actual text and purpose of the MCA. Here, Nobles reminded the Court that 
the MCA was enacted in direct response to Ex parte Crow Dog,176 a case in 
which the Court ruled that federal courts lacked jurisdiction over an Indian-
on-Indian murder occurring in Indian Country.177 When enacting the MCA, 
Congress “used a phrase virtually identical to the [statute] the Court had 
interpreted in Rogers.”178 The statute being interpreted in Rogers referred to 
“crimes committed by one Indian against the person or property of another 
Indian,” whereas the subsequent original wording in the MCA was “all 
Indians, committing against the person or property of another Indian or 
other person any of the following crimes.”179 Nobles argued that, “[b]y 
using language with an established meaning in the statute, Congress 
signaled its intent to retain that meaning.”180  
To show how retaining this deference to the tribes is consistent with the 
purpose of the MCA, Nobles reminded the Court of its reason for upholding 
the constitutionality of the MCA: the federal government owes a “duty of 
protection” to tribes from being mistreated in state court systems.181 For this 
reason, “it would have made no sense to let the state courts decide who is 
an ‘Indian.’”182  
Additionally, Nobles offered the fact that the statute the Court was 
interpreting in Rogers still exists today, rarely amended, as the Indian 
Country Crimes Act, with Section 1152 proscribing intra-Indian crime.183 
Nobles presumes that the term “Indian” holds the same meaning in both the 
ICCA and the MCA; otherwise “it would be possible for federal law to 
proscribe an offense under [a section of the Indian Country Crimes Act] but 
for federal courts to lack jurisdiction to try that offense under [the 
MCA].”184 The definition of “Indian” under section 1152 of the Indian 
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Country Crimes Act must then hold the same definition as “Indian” in 
Rogers, meaning someone whom the tribes themselves regard as Indian.185 
Turning toward the instant case, Nobles argued his case was a good 
demonstration of Congress’s intent to defer to the tribe’s determination of 
whether a person is an Indian.186 Nobles posited that the trial court could 
have simply “consulted Rule 6(b) of the Cherokee Rules of Criminal 
Procedure . . . which showed that the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians 
classified First Descendants as Indians for criminal jurisdictional 
purposes.”187 Instead, the trial court engaged in what Nobles argued was a 
needless, lengthy factual determination to ascertain whether he was 
recognized by the Tribe as an Indian.188  
Finally, Nobles claimed that the North Carolina Supreme Court grossly 
misinterpreted Rogers.189 Specifically, the court erred in holding that 
deferring to the tribes would reduce the Rogers test to one based solely 
upon genetics and would undermine the purpose of the test, which, 
according to the court, is to determine not only blood quantum but also a 
defendant’s other ties to the given tribe.190 Nobles explained that “Indian 
status under Rogers extends to ‘those who by the usages and customs of the 
Indians are regarded as belonging to their race.’”191 From this, Rogers did 
not require defendants to prove their own “ties” to a tribe, like the North 
Carolina Court held; rather, Rogers merely requires that tribes “classify the 
defendant as an Indian, based on whatever ‘usages and customs’ the tribes 
themselves consider relevant.”192  
2. The Court Should Decide Whether Indian Status Under the MCA Is a 
Question for the Jury  
The second question Nobles presented to the Court concerned whether 
he was entitled to a special jury verdict regarding his Indian status.193 This 
section of the writ petition began by asserting that the North Carolina 
Supreme Court appeared to be the only court in the country to ever hold 
that Indian status under the MCA was not a jury question.194 Nobles argued 
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that this conventional view of the issue was the correct one, considering 
that both prongs of the Rogers test are indeed questions of fact.195  
Nobles then contended that the North Carolina Supreme Court may have 
been led astray because it considered this question only after deciding what 
legal standard was most appropriate for determining Indian status.196 This 
is likely why the lower court found that determining this status was an 
inherently legal question for the judge alone.197 Nobles pointed out that 
“factual questions decided by juries are always governed by legal 
standards.”198 Nonetheless, “[t]hat does not make them questions of law.”199 
Regardless of which legal approach the Court found appropriate for 
determining Indian status, stated Nobles, all approaches hinge on factual 
determinations to ultimately decide whether a defendant is or is not 
recognized as an Indian.200 Therefore, the question is only suitable for a 
jury.201 
VI. Analysis 
Although Nobles’ petition was denied, the jurisprudence on this issue 
rightfully begged the Supreme Court to clarify the second prong of the 
Rogers test and declare the appropriate approach for defining “Indian” 
under the MCA. If this question is ever presented for review in the future, 
the most effective solution would be to defer to the Tribe and ask if it 
recognizes Nobles as an Indian. This approach is best for the purposes of 
consistency, conservation of litigation time and resources, and, above all, 
protection of tribal sovereignty. 
A. Consistency Is Vital in Jurisdictional Determinations 
Using either the four-factor or the multi-factor approaches to determine 
tribal recognition under the Rogers test has created nothing close to a 
consistent pattern.202 These approaches have created the possibility of a 
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person being Indian, for purposes of the MCA, in one court and not in 
another. Using an approach that simplifies and gives a bright-line answer to 
a jurisdictional question will promote a court’s consistency and 
predictability.203 Courts should ask a respective tribe if it recognizes an 
individual in a case as Indian rather than engage in countless findings of 
fact. 
Under this approach, an individual will satisfy the “tribal recognition” 
prong of the Rogers test if the court plainly verifies with the claimed tribe 
whether it recognizes that person as Indian for tribal purposes. Deferring to 
the tribes will undeniably bring about the most consistent results, as many 
tribes recognize certain non-members as Indians for purposes of criminal 
jurisdiction and assistance extension.204 Following this approach, the 
inquiry would stop there.  
The majority of requests of tribal recognition will be easily accessible 
from tribal entities if the Court adopts this approach. Most importantly, 
these recognitions will be reliable and undeviating. The alternative, 
nebulous multi-factor tests undeniably hold too much potential for 
producing inconsistent outcomes, which is no way to declare or deny a 
court’s power to hear a case. A person who is “Indian” in one jurisdiction, 
therefore only triable in federal court, should be “Indian” in another to 
preserve the dependability of the justice system.  
B. The Alternative Approaches Waste Time and Resources 
Not only will deferring to tribal recognition produce more consistent 
results, but it will also preserve judicial time and resources. Following the 
alternative approaches requires lengthy hearings, countless findings of fact, 
and understanding the complex ins and outs of tribal government. Under a 
non-tribal recognition approach, these efforts must be completed to declare 
jurisdictional authority while the merits of the case wait idly by.  
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opposite conclusions on defendant’s Indian status). 
 203. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94 (2010) (“[C]ourts benefit from 
straightforward rules under which they can readily assure themselves of their power to hear a 
case. Simple jurisdictional rules also promote greater predictability.”) (citations omitted). 
 204. For example, in Nobles’ case, Rule 6(b) of the Cherokee Rules of Criminal 
Procedure extended the tribe’s criminal jurisdiction to first descendants. Writ Petition, supra 
note 149, at 25; see CHER. R. CRIM. PRO. 6(b), Cherokee RCRP Rule 6 (Westlaw). 
Additionally, the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians held out certain tribal benefits to “first 
descendants.” State v. Nobles, 838 S.E.2d 373, 376 (N.C. 2020). Thus, under this approach, 
the EBCI clearly “recognized” Nobles—a first descendant—as an Indian.  
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The time and resource consumption that comes with relying on multi-
factor tests is highly evident when looking at Nobles’ case. The Nobles trial 
court took a deep and lengthy look into Nobles’ life to determine his Indian 
status. At this pre-trial hearing, the court made itself aware, through 
numerous witnesses and other offerings of evidence, of the following: all 
benefits Nobles was entitled to as a first descendant of the EBCI; how 
Nobles identified his race on various sentencing documents; his residence 
history; how he identified himself regarding race to his probation officers; 
the history of his attendance in the tribal school system; how his mother 
identified his race on school enrollment forms; and his receipt of Indian 
health services as a child.205 The hearing ultimately “contained hundreds of 
detailed findings of fact.”206 This pre-trial determination would have been 
dramatically reduced if the court had used the “deferral to tribes” method in 
establishing tribal recognition. The inquiry would have been simplified to a 
single question to the EBCI of whether it recognized Nobles as an Indian 
for its own purposes. Deferring this determination to tribal entities will 
eliminate the need for courts to delve into all of this factual information and 
ultimately save parties time and money—resources that would then be 
reserved for the main purpose of the litigation at bar. 
C. Deferring to Tribes Best Upholds Tribal Sovereignty  
When Congress enacted the MCA, it essentially assigned jurisdictional 
power to the federal government for certain major crimes committed by 
Indians within Indian Country.207 Although jurisdiction was undoubtedly 
granted to the federal government by the MCA, it is worth asking if it also 
gave courts the authority to decide who is “recognized” as an Indian in 
those cases. Nobles makes valid legal arguments as to why leaving this 
determination up to the tribes falls in line with the Court’s decision in 
Rogers, the text of the MCA, and the purpose of the MCA.208 Arguably 
more important, however, is the fact that letting federal and state courts 
delve into what constitutes a person “recognized” as Indian considerably 
chips away at tribal sovereignty.  
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Certainly, if tribes have the absolute right to determine tribal 
membership,209 they have the same right to define who they recognize as an 
Indian (whether for purposes of criminal jurisdiction or for the extension of 
benefits to certain non-members). It is inarguable that courts attempting to 
determine correct jurisdiction over a person claiming Indian status under 
the MCA have an interest in making sure that person meets the second 
prong of the Rogers test and is indeed recognized as Indian by a tribal 
entity. However, that recognition should be verified by the tribe itself, not 
federal and state judges and juries. With the alternative approaches, judges 
and juries in the United States are, in a very literal sense, deciding what 
factors make a certain individual “Indian” enough to be recognized as such. 
This declaration of recognition should be left to the tribe. There is no better 
certification of recognition as an Indian than a tribe’s own determination. 
Therefore, this is the approach the Supreme Court should adopt if, at some 
point, it ever considers this issue. 
VII. Conclusion 
Nobles’ writ petition gave the Supreme Court an opportunity to clean up 
the jurisdictional predicament that has been fostered by the lack of a bright-
line definition for “Indian” under the MCA. Hopefully, it will reconsider 
reviewing this matter if another defendant was to raise the issue once more. 
The legal silence around this subject has created three differing approaches 
to determining the second prong of the Rogers test, meaning one person 
may be considered Indian in one jurisdiction and not in another. The circuit 
split has created critically inconsistent jurisdictional results across the 
United States and rightfully warrants a clarifying answer from the Supreme 
Court.  
As Nobles argued in his petition, the Court, if is presented with the 
opportunity again, should adopt the approach deferring the “tribal 
recognition” determination to the respective tribe itself. This approach 
allows for more consistency, considering most tribes regularly make this 
determination already. It additionally allows for preservation of valuable 
litigation time and resources; under this approach, a single inquiry will 
suffice, in contrast to lengthy hearings for the determination. Most 
importantly, this approach best safeguards tribal sovereignty by letting 
tribal entities decide who they recognize as an Indian.  
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This circuit split has long muddied the waters of federal and state 
jurisdictional authority over Native American peoples. State v. Nobles 
offered an overdue moment of clarity to be delivered by the Supreme Court 
and should have been treated as such.  
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